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This article contributes to the discussion 
within the "Towards the Common Past" inter-
national academic network bringing together 
scholars from Russia, the Baltic States and the 
Nordic countries. It assesses the relationship 
between globalization and historical memory, 
thus contributing to the discussion on global-
ization and the roles and applications of his-
tory. On the basis of an analysis of academic 
discourses on globalization and historical 
memory, the author arrives at two conclu-
sions. On the one hand, the proponents of 
globalization use historical memory as one of 
their arguments: they claim that the history of 
globalization in international relations 
stretches back to the 19th century, thus globali-
zation is an irreversible process. On the other 
hand, globalization attaches international sig-
nificance to historical events that were earlier 
considered as being of local importance. The 
author proves the latter statement through 
comparing Russian and Estonian discourses 
on the relationship between the events which 
took place in Tallinn in September 1944 and 
April 2007. Highlighting the differences be-
tween the two discourses may help Russian 
scholars understand the reasons behind the 
political decisions made by the Estonian au-
thorities in April 2007. It accounts for the 
practical significance of the research conduc-
ted, since one of the most important objectives 
of international relations as a discipline is not 
to explain what decision would have been the 
most appropriate in the given situation, but to 
further the understanding of the reasons be-
hind the actually made decision. The author 
expresses his gratitude to his counterparts 
from St. Petersburg State University and the 
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, as 
well as those from the Universities of Lund 
(Sweden), Tampere (Finland), and Tartu (Es-
tonia) for their comments on the earlier ver-
sions of the article. At the same time, the au-
thor alone bears all the responsibility for the 
conclusions drawn in the article. 
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The authors of a great number of research works on globalization empha-
sise that globalization, despite the fact that this category entered the scientific 
vocabulary only in the 1990s, took place 100 years earlier — in the late 19th 
century. For example, K. Waltz does not only state that the processes known 
today as globalization were characteristic of international relations of the 
time; he also claims that the globalization of international relations of the 
early 20th century was deeper than that of the end of the century [21]. It is 
one of the most important arguments of the advocates of globalization 
among the intellectual elite: globalization has a long history, thus, it should 
be perceived as an objective process and, hence, there is little sense in asking 
whether a certain state should take part in the globalization processes — 
there is a need to start a practical discussion on the specific steps to be taken 
in that direction. 
This logical conclusion rests on the erroneously interpreted principle of 
historical determinism: if this or that phenomenon has existed over a long 
period, hence, its existence is predetermined by the “course of historical de-
velopment”. This argument is often used by the advocates of conservative 
approach to different issues, although the history of conservative thought is 
rich in examples of criticism both against this argument and the principle of 
historical determinism in general. Historical determinism is associated with 
the name of G. Hegel. In his work Philosophy of history, he, first of all, out-
lines the principle of dialectics in terms of historical development, which 
claims that conflicts are the driving force of history and, secondly, suggests 
that the emergence of a new political system is politically determined by the 
conflicts that existed within the preceding political system [4]. 
The concept of historical determinism borrowed from Hegel formed the 
basis of Marxist ideas of history. As shown above, they are still relevant and 
make it possible for the adherents of globalization theories to develop a 
comprehensive idea of modern international relations and the role of global-
ization in them from the leftist point of view. However, these ideas are 
strongly opposed by the advocates of conservative perspective on the course 
of historical development. For instance, Edmund Burke considered historical 
development not as progress predetermined by an external force, but belie-
ved that it depends on the ideas and behaviour of certain people [17, p. 40]. 
This assumption explains the interest shown by American historians to indi-
vidual historical figures. It underlies the central thesis of conservatism found 
in the rhetoric of Russian conservatives of the early 21st century — the “hu-
man factor” thesis. 
Indeed, the notion of conservatism has been used in the rhetoric of the 
leaders of the United Russia political party since its foundation in the late 
2001. The same year, the future chairperson of the party’s Supreme council, 
Boris Gryzlov, defended a PhD thesis which, in particular, identified the pre-
requisites for the formation of the conservative component of the Russian 
political spectrum [6]. In 2002, when B. V. Gryzlov was elected the chair-
person of the party’s Supreme council, references to conservatism in the 
context of the party’s ideological framework became constant. Conservative 
objectives are still actively used a decade later [5]. Simultaneously with the 
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emergence of the conservatism thesis in the rhetoric of the United Russia’s 
leaders, they started to use the “human factor” thesis. However, the meaning 
of this notion in the interpretation of Russian conservatives of the 21st centu-
ry proved to differ essentially from that attached to it by Burke. 
Indeed, the “human factor” thesis is used in modern Russia predominant-
ly to explain the negative phenomena occurring in the country, which serves 
two purposes. On the one hand, it helps overcome the irresponsibility inte-
gral to the Russian politics of the preceding period, when all negative phe-
nomena were explained by objective reasons or, if none were found, by the 
nature of transition period. On the other hand, it contributes to the legitima-
tion of the existing political regime: one gets an impression that positive 
phenomena prevail in the country, whereas individual negative ones are de-
termined by the “human factor”. It diverges from the interpretation of the 
“human factor” notion given in the works of E. Burke who believed that it 
lies behind all phenomena in history — both positive and negative ones. 
Historical determinism is also unacceptable for another conservative his-
torian — A. de Tocqueville. Alongside the “human facor”, his works pay 
significant attention to the role of coincidence in history. It will be shown 
below to what extent the ideas of political leaders about the role of coinci-
dence in historical development influence their foreign policy and how these 
ideas change from region to region. As to historical determinism, A. de Toc-
queville uses the term “doctrine of necessity”, which, in his opinion, can 
“paralyze the activity of a modern society” [11, p. 367]. Historical deter-
minism, according to de Tocqueville is integral only to the historians of 
“democratic ages”; he cites American historians as an example. Indeed, the 
principle of historical determinism is found in the works of the American 
historian B. Adams published at the turn of the 19th century [14]. 
It is not surprising that, in the situation of coexistence of at least two ap-
proaches to history (historical determinism and the so-called conservative 
approach), theorists of history start posing questions about the functions of 
history. F. Nietzsche was one of the first to address this issue in an early 
work of his [9], which reflects the crisis of historical knowledge characteris-
tic of the 19th century Europe. On the one hand, this crisis posed the question 
about the function of historical knowledge, which might not have arisen in 
other circumstances. On the other hand, this crisis generated attempts to 
overcome it through transforming history into a science in accordance with 
the requirements of positivistic philosophy. Actually, the mentioned work 
was written by F. Nietzsche in the context of these attempts, for, in his opin-
ion, it is impossible to make history an objective science, as positivistic phi-
losophy demands. Moreover, such attempts could be harmful to the existing 
society. 
The revision of Nietzsche’s work resulted in a large number of publica-
tions aiming to answer the question about the functions of history; one can-
not but mention Being and Time by M. Heidegger [13]. To an extent, another 
example of such publications is the historical works of F. Braudel, where the 
idea of impossibility of objective understanding of history underlies the the-
sis about the multiplicity of history: each civilization creates its own history 
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and all these histories are true [3]. At the same time, Braudel is, first of all, a 
teacher of history rather than a researcher, thus he writes about the impact of 
teaching history. In his opinion, this impact can be both negative and posi-
tive: teaching history as multiple histories that are different for different civi-
lizations can facilitate a dialogue between them, whereas teaching history in 
the context of determinism will, on the contrary, hamper it. 
Historical determinism is still a popular concept — both among profes-
sional historians trying to turn history into an objective science (which was 
strongly opposed by F. Nietzsche), and those authors who use historical 
knowledge to corroborate their theories relating to the problem fields of oth-
er sciences, including political science. A good example is the F. Fuku-
yama’s concept of “the end of history” [12]. He bases his theoretical reaso-
ning on the historical fact, according to which there were few democratic 
states in the early 19th century and their number increased to several dozen 
by the end of the 20th century. Therefore, Fukuyama concludes, democracy 
is a historically determined process; later, he focuses on the analysis of pos-
sible consequences of democratisation. 
R. Kagan, when criticising F. Fukuyama, also uses historical determi-
nism to corroborate his ideas. As most critics of F. Fukuyama, R. Kagan ad-
dresses the first part of his work, which postulates that the world history is 
essentially a history of wars, whereas wars ceased against the background of 
universal democratisation. The second part of F. Fukuyama’s work, which 
accounts for the phrase “last man” in the title, is ignored by R. Kagan. Even 
the structure of R. Kagan’s work exhibits features of historical determinism. 
Indeed, democratisation has a certain history, therefore (as the principle of 
historical determinism suggests), it has a future. It is a different issue that, in 
R. Kagan’s interpretation, the future of democratisation does not seem to be 
as bright as F. Fukuyama saw it in the early 1990s, since the autocratic tra-
dition has “a long and distinguished past” [7, p. 32]. 
Probably, historical determinism does not lose its popularity owing to the 
impact on the society, as a result of which the notions of “pre-existent” and 
“outlying” become identical [10, p.32]. In other words, thanks to historical 
determinism, people believe that, if something existed before, it will exist 
after and, if something did not exist before, it can be considered (at best) a 
fad that will disappear in a short-term perspective. As to political science, 
the phenomena and processes of the political world, whose history can be 
traced, are classed as firmly established, whereas those phenomena and pro-
cesses, whose history cannot be traced, can be ignored. Thus, the function of 
historical knowledge underlies most of the cases of history used for political 
purposes; recently, sociologists have registered an increase in the frequency 
of historical references in political rhetoric. 
So, A. Astrov aspires to find the reasons (other than Russophobia) of an 
increased attention paid by the government of modern Estonia to what is 
called the “legacy of totalitarianism” [2]. Indeed, over almost three centuries, 
the relations between Russia and the title nation of Estonia have been very 
controversial, and the Soviet Estonian period is considered by the majority 
of the title nation in terms of conflict, thus, it is not surprising that most Es-
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tonian citizens share anti-Russian sentiments. One can get an impression that 
these sentiments make the government of a small European country refer to 
the legacy of totalitarianism at all accessible international fora to exert pres-
sure on Russia — the legal successor to the largest totalitarian power of the 
past. As A. Astrov, whose opinion we share, emphasises, this conviction is 
erroneous, and the reasons for historical references in the rhetoric of Esto-
nian political leaders should be sought for — in concordance with F. Nie-
tzsche’s views — not in the past, but in the present. As of today, Russian-
Estonian relations cannot be called friendly — they rather gravitate to irra-
tional animosity. 
In this connection, it seems that the reason for such scrupulous attention 
of Estonia to the issue of totalitarianism should be sought for not in the East — 
in Russia, but in the West. Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Es-
tonian foreign policy was aimed at being recognised by the West as an inte-
gral part of it. And this aim was achieved: at costs considerable by the meas-
urements of a small state with modest budget and through an active anti-
Russian campaign, which was targeted at “foreign audience”, Estonia ac-
ceded to NATO and the European Union — the most important communities 
of the West. However, this time was plagued with certain doubts regarding 
the future of the united West, which could be replaced by conflicting Europe 
and America. Consequently, Estonia faced a difficult choice — what part of 
the West to remain with. Among political elites, the thesis is advanced that 
the unification of the West could be facilitated by reviving the image of a 
“common enemy” — in the age of the Cold War, the West was united in its 
opposition to totalitarianism. Hence the aspiration of the Estonian govern-
ment to raise the question of condemning totalitarianism at all international 
fora putting emphasis on its “eastern” manifestations; at the same time, Es-
tonian leaders believe that the references to “western” totalitarianism, for in-
stance, fascism, will lead to the disintegration of the big West. 
Far away from Estonia, in Australia, we find another example of a politi-
cal leader relying on the policy of memory [18]. It is J. Howard, who held 
the position of Australian Prime Minister in 1996—2007; his term in office 
coincided with the launch of the “global war against terror” proclaimed by 
the US President G. W. Bush after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. At the time, Australia faced a difficult choice. On the one hand, Aus-
tralia was a consistent ally of the USA throughout the period of the Cold 
War; on the other hand, the accession to the coalition headed by the USA 
would make Australia vulnerable to terrorism, as it did happen several years 
later, when Australian citizens lost their lives as a result of a terrorist attack 
on the island of Bali. Prime Minister J. Howard decided on joining the coali-
tion and, in order to legitimate this decision among the voters, he rested on 
the policy of memory. 
For politicians, historical determinism is a means to legitimate their deci-
sions. When explaining a certain decision, political leaders form an idea in 
the public opinion that it was not made of their own accord, but was prede-
termined by history itself. Examples of using this principle are found beyond 
the process of political decision making. So, arguments based on historical 
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determinism are often put forward by leaders of extreme nationalist move-
ments. At the same time, scholars still discuss the origins of nationalism. The 
advocates of the so-called primordial approach emphasise that nations are 
formed on the basis of objective factors that have existed since time imme-
morial, such as shared territory, race, religion, language, traditions and cus-
toms, economic system, etc. [19]. They are opposed by the adherents of the 
so-called modernist approach [1]. From their point of view, the European na-
tions formed in the 18th—19th century as a result of the Industrial revolution, 
urbanisation, and modernisation; later nationalism accompanied by moderni-
sation spread throughout the world. 
Extreme nationalists deny the mere fact of existence of the modernist 
theory. For them, nations emerged long before the beginning of modernisa-
tion in Europe in different periods; and a superior status is granted to the na-
tion that formed earlier. Thus, extreme nationalists use historical knowledge 
to prove the fact that their nation had existed long before the contiguous 
lands were populated by neighbouring nations and to emphasize their natio-
nal superiority over the neighbours. This technique is used by extreme na-
tionalists of different countries, which results in a certain “war of histories”, 
in the course of which representatives of different nations try to prove the 
antiquity of their origin by all means available. 
An example of applying the historical determinism principle is the theo-
ry of democracy. An increase in the number of democratic states on the 
planet resulted in almost all the world countries proclaiming themselves de-
mocracies (an exception is the absolute monarchies of the Middle East), in-
cluding North Korea, which is officially called the Democratic People's Re-
public of Korea. Thus, there emerged a need to create a classification of de-
mocratic regimes; one of the approaches was the division into “old” and 
“young” democracies. “Old” democratic regimes are believed to contain no 
threat to democracy, while “young” democracies are unstable and require 
protection, at least, the presence of international observers. Some researchers 
even pinpoint the date when the threat to “young democracies” reaches its 
peak level — it is the date of the second parliamentary elections after the 
adoption of a democratic constitution [15]. 
The principle of historical determinism was not taken into account by the 
American administration in the period of the above-mentioned crisis of the 
West, which occurred in the first decade of the 21st century. Back then, cer-
tain European countries opposed to the US policy in the world in general and 
in the Middle East in particular, whereas other European states supported the 
USA. This support was provided, first of all, by Central European and Baltic 
countries. As to these states, the ex-Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld 
used the metaphor of “the new Europe”, implying that "the new" means 
"progressive" [16]. Those opposing the US policy were correspondingly 
proclaimed “the old Europe”, which implied their incapability of further de-
velopment. It seems that D. Rumsfeld ignored the principle of historical de-
terminism, according to which, the “old” is more attractive than the “new”. 
The rhetorical device did not yield the desired result: “old” Europe did not 
want to become “new”. 
D. A. Lanko 
11 
As to the field of international relations, one cannot but recall the discus-
sion initiated by experts in international relations on the prospects of the 
Westphalian system of international relations. Some scholars maintain that it 
will soon be replaced by a new system of international relations; others be-
lieve that there are no alternatives to states in the modern world, thus, the 
Westphalian system will remain intact for many years to come. It is remar-
kable that those predicting the imminent fall of the Westphalian system em-
phasize that, in 1648 — the official birth year of the system, only the mere 
principle was formulated, whereas relations within Europe started to con-
form to it not earlier than the 20th century. The advocates of the Westphalian 
system, in their turn, stress that, although it started to develop in 1648, its in-
dividual components emerged long before that, during the Hundred Years’ 
War [20]. 
In a similar way, the history of globalization gives its adherents an addi-
tional argument in the disputes with the critics of this process: they maintain 
that, since globalization has a long history and its existence is predetermined 
by the “course of historical development”, criticising this phenomenon is fu-
tile. It seems to be the way historical knowledge affects the discussion on 
globalization. At the same time, globalization affects historical knowledge. 
Thanks to globalization, the international community learns about historical 
events that earlier were of significance only for individual peoples or even 
local communities. Moreover, interpretations of these events lead to interna-
tional conflicts, thus, the “end of history” predicted by F. Fukuyama has not 
taken place yet; historical issues are increasingly addressed within interna-
tional relations. 
A representative example is the internal Estonian conflict that rapidly 
developed in a Russian-Estonian diplomatic battle, whose climax was 
reached in April 2007. Back then, the government of the Republic of Estonia 
led by Prime Minister A. Ansip decided to deliver on their election promises 
made prior to the recent parliamentary elections and relocate the Monument 
to the Soviet liberators from the centre of Tallinn. This monument was 
dubbed by the Estonian Russian-speaking community as the Bronze soldier, 
ethnic Estonians call it simply the Bronze man. The relocation of the monu-
ment and the way it was carried out gave rise to social unrest initiated by the 
Russian-speaking community. I already published my arguments as to the 
reasons why the Russian-speaking Estonian youth chose this form of politi-
cal protest [8]. In this article, I would focus on the arguments of the Estonian 
government, since they seem to be a good illustration of the influence of 
globalization on historical knowledge. 
Over the years after the social unrest in Tallinn in April 2007, numerous 
reasons for the relocation of the monument and relocation conducted at that 
particular time were given. Numerous corruption scandals within the Esto-
nian government taking place in 2003—2005 were pointed out; there were 
assumptions that the expensive plot of land in the centre of Tallinn occupied 
by the monument drew the attention of an Estonian company. The past years 
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proved this version inconsistent, since nothing has been built on the site after 
the relocation. There were talks about the past of Prime Minister A. Ansip, 
who became the only high-ranking ex-communist in the country, after Presi-
dent Arnold Rüütel retired from his position, and had to emphasize his break 
with the communist past, as well as his loyalty to the Republic of Estonia. 
An interesting version was put forward by A. Astrov which was mentio-
ned above. Another version can be produced on the basis of juxtaposing the 
historical events significant for the Russian community and the community 
of modern Estonia, the ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking popula-
tion. It shows that, when calling the Bronze soldier a historical monument, 
the communities of the two countries have in mind two different events that 
the monument symbolizes for them. For the Russian community, of special 
importance are two historical dates of the World War II period — June 22, 
1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and May 9, 1945, 
when the former was crushed. For the Russian community, the Bronze sol-
dier symbolizes the second date — May 9, the Day of Victory of the Soviet 
Union in the Great Patriotic War. For them, the relocation of the Bronze sol-
dier from the centre of Tallinn symbolizes the disrespect of ethnic Estonians 
for this date. 
At the same time, little attention was paid to the fact that each local 
community has its “own” historical dates, symbolized by certain objects of 
material culture, including historical monuments. As to the Bronze soldier, 
for Estonians, such a date is September 22, 1944 — the day of liberation of 
Tallinn from German occupants. Every year, many representatives of the 
Russian-speaking community of the Estonian capital were coming to the 
Bronze soldier to lay flowers not only on May 9, but also on September 22. 
And it was a march on September 22, not a traditional march of the Russian-
speaking community at the Bronze soldier on May 9 that caused the discon-
tent of ethnic Estonians, as a response to which the government made a deci-
sion on the relocation of the monument. 
The day of September 22, 1944 did not only bring Estonians the libera-
tion from Nazi dictatorship, but also marked the beginning of a forty-year 
period of futile attempts at building communism. Estonians believe that Nazi 
occupation was replaced by Soviet occupation. I would like to emphasize 
that I do not express my opinion, but describe that of most Estonian citizens 
of the title nationality. This discrepancy in views on historical dates which 
the monument was designed to symbolize and the act of its relocation un-
derlay a conflict between the Russian community and the Russian-speaking 
community of Estonia on one side and the ethnic Estonians on the other. 
Russians and the Russian-speaking community of Estonia consider the relo-
cation of the monument disrespect for the important for them historical date — 
May 9, 1945. 
In their turn, the ethnic Estonians, many of whom celebrate May 9 as the 
day Europe was liberated from Nazism, consider the relocation of the mon-
ument disregard for another historical date — September 22. 
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In the conditions when the ethnic Estonians failed in conveying the im-
portance of this very date to the Russian-speaking community, a conflict was 
inevitable. Thus, the new historical date — September 22, 1944, earlier of 
local significance (celebrated by the residents of Tallinn) — initiated an in-
ternational conflict and gained international significance. 
The events in Estonia are another representative example of how, in the 
age of globalization, earlier locally significant historical events acquire glob-
al significance and how the historical memory of this event gives rise to in-
ternational conflicts. 
In my opinion, the relocation of the monument and the burial site of the 
Soviet soldiers could have been presented for public discussion, as a result of 
which (with due military honours and observing international legal formali-
ties) the actions under consideration could be performed. It would have been 
a compromise between the two models of historical memory and the conflict 
would not have escalated to such a point. 
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